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Abstract
It is argued that the conventional formulation of quantum me-
chanics is inadequate: the usual interpretation of the mathematical
formalism in terms of the results of measurements cannot be applied
to situations in which discontinuous transitions (“quantum jumps”)
are observed as they happen, since nothing that can be called a mea-
surement happens at the moment of observation. Attempts to force
such observations into the standard mould lead to absurd results: “a
watched pot never boils”. Experiments show both that this result is
correct when the experiment does indeed consist of a series of mea-
surements, and that it is not when the experiment consists of a pe-
riod of observation: quantum jumps do happen. The possibilities for
improving the formulation by incorporating transitions in the basic
postulates are reviewed, and a satisfactory postulate is obtained by
modifying a suggestion of Bell’s. This requires a distinction between
the external description of the whole of a physical system and internal
descriptions which are themselves physical events in the system. It is
shown that this gives correct results for simple unstable systems and
for the quantum-jump experiments.
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1 Introduction
In 1929 Erwin Schro¨dinger complained “If I had known we were going to go
on having all this damned quantum-jumping, I would never have got involved
in the subject” [18]. Over twenty years later he was still not reconciled to
the idea, posing the question “Are there quantum jumps?” as the title of a
paper in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. After another 34
years the question was definitively answered in another title when Nagour-
ney, Sandberg and Dehmelt published their paper “Shelved optical electron
amplifier: observation of quantum jumps” in Physical Review Letters. But
in spite of the direct and visible evidence for the reality of quantum jumps
provided by this beautiful experiment, their place in theory is still not clear.
The mathematical formulation of quantum mechanics is just as continuous as
Schro¨dinger could have wished; the jumps, if they are present in the theory at
all, are there only as part of the interpretive framework. In this paper I want
to examine the necessity for and the possibility of an element of discontinuity
in the theoretical framework of quantum mechanics.
To a particle physicist one of the most paradoxical aspects of quantum
mechanics is that it is the only theoretical framework for one’s subject and yet
it does not acknowledge the fundamental empirical elements in which one is
interested. The evidence which must be explained by theories of elementary
particle physics consists of events like the decay of the Ω− particle captured
in the bubble chamber photograph of Figure 1. But there are no events in
quantum theory.1 The nearest thing to an event described in the basic theory
is the result of a measurement — something which has been deliberately
provoked by an experimenter’s conscious action. There is no way that the
theory can describe events, like the Ω− decay in Figure 1, which happen
spontaneously and are passively recorded by the waiting experimenter —
which is how the photograph of Figure 1 was obtained.
Nevertheless, textbooks do purport to derive decay rates for such events
from the general principles of quantum mechanics. The derivation goes like
this. To describe a decay A→ B+C we start at time t = 0 with a state |A〉
in which the unstable particle A is certain not to have decayed, and follow
its time evolution, governed by a Hamiltonian H , to a superposition of the
1The word “event” sometimes occurs in the sense of probability theory, with the mean-
ing of “a statement being true” – for example, van Fraassen [37] claims to base his modal
interpretation on events, but defines an event as the truth of a statement of the form
“Observable B has value b”. Throughout this paper I will use “event” with its primary
English meaning of “happening”.
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Figure 1: The world’s first Ω− event (Brookhaven National Laboratory,
1964).
initial state and a state of the decay products B and C:
e−iHt|A〉 = a(t)|A〉+ b(t)|BC〉. (1)
The general principles of quantum mechanics are then supposed to yield the
interpretation that |b(t)|2 is the probability that by time t there has been a
transition from particle A to particles B + C.
But where does this notion of a “transition” come from? It appears
nowhere in the general principles of the theory, as usually stated. The literal
application of these principles to the state (1) gives only the statement that if
a measurement is made at time t (to determine, say, whether a particle of type
B is present), then |b(t)|2 is the probability that the result of the measurement
will be positive. The inference that something discontinuous (a transition)
happened between time 0 and time t is completely unwarranted. According
to the official principles, quantum systems evolve continuously (as the time
dependence of (1) shows), and quantum jumps occur only when provoked by
the intervention of an experimenter. Despite Schro¨dinger’s famous satire in
his story of the cat, this remains the only description that the conventional
form of the theory can tolerate; the idea of a transition must be a deplorable
backsliding into classical habits of thought.
If this is what official quantum mechanics pronounces, then so much the
worse for official quantum mechanics. In the actual physical situation that
we are trying to describe, it is talk of “a measurement at time t” that is
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unwarranted. If a measurement can be said to take place at all when a decay
is observed, it is an extended process occupying an interval of time rather
than an instant; and the empirically meaningful time t is not the time at
which the experimenter decides to make a measurement on the system, but
the time at which the system does something for the experimenter to observe.
Of course, there is no questioning the success of the theory in predicting
the right transition rates. The procedure that starts with the time-dependent
state vector (1), produces from it a time-dependent probability P (t), inter-
prets this as a probability of something having happened, and on the strength
of this interpretation derives from P (t) a transition probability per unit time,
certainly ends up with an empirically adequate result. The problem I want
to discuss is that of formulating the theory so as to make this argument as
sound as its conclusion. I will argue that the germ of a solution was pro-
vided by John Bell in 1984 ([6]; see also [34] and [9]), but that it needs to be
transposed into a different interpretative framework in order to be fully sat-
isfactory. In this paper I will do no more than suggest how this transposition
might be achieved.
Before discussing Bell’s formulation, however, I would like to sharpen the
problem by reviewing (a) the result of taking the conventional interpretation
literally and pushing it to what seems to be its logical conclusion, and (b)
the experiments which demonstrate the reality of quantum jumps.
2 Quantum Jumps and Watched Pots: The-
ory and Experiment
A WATCHED POT NEVER BOILS
Let us imagine ourselves in the situation of steadily watching the un-
stable particle A in the process A → B + C — suppose it is a radioactive
nucleus surrounded by a spherical detector wired to a loudspeaker, and we
are listening for the click which will announce that the decay has occurred.
Being attentive observers, we know at every instant of our watch whether
we have heard a click or not. How can this situation be described in con-
ventional quantum mechanics? It seems to require that a measurement is
made at every instant, our knowledge at each instant being the result of the
corresponding measurement. But this involves an uncountable number of
measurements in a finite interval, which, as well as being embarrassing to
analyse, probably flatters our vigilance. Let us compromise by considering a
finite sequence of measurements and trying to capture the ideal of continuous
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awareness by letting the measurements get closer and closer in time, taking
the limit as the separation between them tends to zero. We will replace
steady watching with repeated looking.
The result is disconcerting [42, 22, 33]. We suppose that in the time
interval [0, T ] there are N + 1 measurements at times 0 = t0, t1, . . . , tN = T .
Let pn be the probability that the measurement at time tn gives the result
“A” (of the two possible results “A” or “B + C”), i.e. the probability that
at this time we are aware that no decay has occurred. According to the
projection postulate of conventional quantum mechanics, the measurement
causes the system to jump into one of the states A or B + C, depending on
the result of the measurement, after which it resumes (or rather — and this
is crucial — restarts) its evolution following the Schro¨dinger equation. As
a consequence of the unitary evolution in quantum mechanics, the resulting
probabilities always satisfy:
Theorem [22, 33] In the limit as the dissection {t0, . . . , tN} becomes in-
finitely fine, pN − p0 → 0.
So if the unstable particle is observed assiduously enough, the probability
that it has decayed at time T is the same as at time 0, namely zero if we start
out knowing that it has not decayed. A watched pot never boils. Either that,
or continual measurement is not a good model for continuous observation.
WATCHED POTS IN THE LABORATORY2
The conclusion of the above theorem has come to be known as the quantum
Zeno paradox — an unfortunate name, since Zeno’s paradox of the arrow
was resolved by Newton in classical mechanics and does not even arise in
quantum mechanics. (Zeno’s argument was that if one only considers the
configuration of a physical object in space, there is no difference between a
stationary arrow and a moving one and therefore no reason why any arrow
should behave differently from a stationary one. Newton’s answer is that
position is not enough: at any instant, velocity is an independent property
of an object which must also be specified before the equations of motion
can be solved, these being second-order differential equations. In quantum
mechanics, this does not apply. The equation of motion is first-order and a
specification of configuration (in the form of a wave function ψ(x)) is enough.
So Zeno’s paradox is purely classical, in physical terms as well as historical
ones.)
The proverbial wisdom that a watched pot never boils, on the other hand,
becomes an objective fact only in quantum mechanics. This is not because
2For a good recent review see [40].
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of the role played by measurement — the significance of measurement in the
proof of the watched-pot theorem is the change in the probabilities brought
about by a change in knowledge, and this is as much a feature of classical
probability as of quantum mechanics. The distinctive contribution of quan-
tum mechanics to the calculation is the form of the transition probability
P (t) as a function of time. Because it is the square of the inner product be-
tween two vectors which are initially orthogonal, it behaves like t2 for small t
and is therefore slower to get started than a classical Poisson process, which
behaves like t; if it is continually forced to reset while in this vulnerable early
stage of its life, it never gets off the ground at all.
Experiments can test this distinctive small-time behaviour and demon-
strate the watched-pot phenomenon which can be uncontroversially deduced
from it, without any appeal to dubious projection postulates, in a situation
where there clearly are very short, rapidly repeated physical processes which
can be treated as measurements. The experiments have been performed by
Itano et al. [17] and confirm the theorem: the effect of very rapidly repeated,
very short-duration interventions on an evolving quantum system is to freeze
the evolution. This is the first arm of the disjunction at the end of the
previous section. In the same and other laboratories the second arm of the
disjunction has also been confirmed: if the experimental situation is one of
passive, low-energy observation rather than active, high-enery probing, then
the evolution is not affected, there is no watched-pot effect, and quantum
jumps do occur.
In the quantum-jump experiment [25, 31, 8], originally proposed in 1975
by Dehmelt [14] as a practical method of detecting weak atomic transitions,
a single trapped ion is observed as it makes transitions between three energy
levels. The relevant levels, illustrated in Fig. 2, are a ground state and two
excited states, one strongly coupled and one weakly coupled to the ground
state. Let E0, E1 and E2 be the energies of the ground state, the strongly
coupled excited state and the weakly coupled excited state, and let us suppose
that the frequencies (E1 −E0)/h and (E2 −E0)/h are those of red and blue
light respectively. The ion is illuminated by a laser beam tuned to the red
frequency; absorption and stimulated emission of the laser mode cause the
ion to oscillate between the ground state and the first excited state. Since
these states are strongly coupled, the excited state also spontaneously emits
photons at the red frequency but in other directions than that of the laser
beam; these photons, which are emitted at a rate of thousands per second,
enable the experimenter to see directly that the ion is in the subspace spanned
by the ground state and the first excited state.
The ion is now illuminated by a second light source, low in intensity
and tuned to the blue frequency, which can stimulate transitions from the
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Figure 2: The atomic levels used in the quantum-jump experiment
ground state to the second excited state (the “shelf” state). Since this state
is weakly coupled to the ground state, it has a long lifetime and the ion will
stay on the shelf for some time. This is observed as an interruption in the
red fluorescence from the first excited state. Seeing the sudden start of this
dark period is an observation of a quantum jump from the ground state to
the shelf; its equally sharp end marks a jump from the shelf down to the
ground state.
The watched-pot experiment [17] uses a similar ion, but the roles of the
two states are reversed. The continuous laser beam is now tuned to the
blue frequency, so that the ion oscillates between the ground state and the
weakly coupled second excited state; the weakness of the coupling makes the
oscillation slow. This oscillation is regarded as the natural evolution of the
two-state system formed by the ground state and the second excited state
of the ion. The experiment consists of measurements to determine which of
the two states the system is in, using intense laser pulses of light at the red
frequency. If the ion is in the ground state, it will absorb a photon from the
red pulse and be excited to the first excited state. Observation immediately
afterwards of an emitted red photon, not in the direction of the laser beam,
provides the result of the measurement (“ground state”) and, in accord with
the projection postulate, leaves the system in the ground state. On the other
hand, if the ion was in the second excited state then the red pulse will have
no effect on it. Observation of no red photon provides the result “second
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excited state” and leaves the system in that state.
In Itano and Wineland’s experiment a large number of such ions, initially
in the ground state, were illuminated by the blue laser and allowed to oscillate
without measurements for half a period. By switching off the blue laser beam
and counting the photons emitted in the subsequent (slow) decay to the
ground state, it was confirmed that the ions had all evolved as expected and
reached the second excited state. Then the same evolution was subjected to
repeated measurements by means of a large number of short red laser pulses.
At the end of the same half-period, it was found that all of the ions were now
in the ground state. The watched pot had not boiled.
WATCHED POTS IN THE STUDY
What is the theoretical difference between these two experiments, and
why doesn’t the watched-pot theorem apply equally to both? In both cases
we have an object system which is under investigation and whose state would,
if left to itself, develop according to the Schro¨dinger equation:
|ψ0〉 → |ψ(t)〉 = a(t)|ψ1〉+ b(t)|ψ2〉
where |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are experimentally distinguishable states. We need to go
deeper than the superficial interpretation which declares that a measurement
at time t will have a result (1 or 2) and that after the measurement the system
will be in the appropriate state |ψ1〉 or |ψ2〉. Following von Neumann, we must
include the apparatus in the quantum description and consider a combined
system of the object together with the apparatus, with product states |ψ〉|α〉
where |α〉 denotes a state of the apparatus. A measurement is brought about
by an interaction between the object and the apparatus which changes the
combined state as follows:
|ψ1〉|α0〉 → |ψ1〉|α1〉
|ψ2〉|α0〉 → |ψ2〉|α2〉
where |α0〉 is the initial (“ready”) state of the apparatus and |α1〉 and |α2〉
are the states in which it registers the results 1 and 2. Thus the whole process
of making a measurement on a changing object system can be represented as
|ψ0〉|α0〉 → |ψ(t)〉|α0〉 → a(t)|ψ1〉|α1〉+ b(t)|ψ2〉|α2〉.
It is clear from this that the Hamiltonian for the interaction between the
apparatus and the object must be time-dependent; the apparatus has to be
switched on at time t, when the measurement starts. Here is the difference
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between the watched-pot experiment and the quantum-jump experiment.
In the first the interaction between the object and the apparatus is indeed
time-dependent; the apparatus consists of the pulsed laser beam, and there
is time dependence in the pulsing. In the quantum-jump experiment there
is no time dependence: there is a steady laser beam, and a photon detector
which is switched on before the experiment begins and is in a constant state
of readiness to respond. Thus the theoretical measurement events at times
t0, . . . , tN in the watched-pot theorem fairly describe the physical reality in
the watched-pot experiment, but they have no place in the quantum-jump
experiment and it should be no surprise that the conclusion of the theorem
is not verified.
A theoretical analysis [33] of continuous observation of an unstable sys-
tem, with a constant interaction between the observing apparatus and the
decaying system, gives some reason to believe in the watched-pot effect even
in this situation. The crucial parameter is the response time of the observing
apparatus in comparison to the time constants of the decaying system. It
is not the lifetime T of the decay that is important, but the time τ during
which the decay probability behaves quadratically, before the onset of the
exponential regime which is all that is usually observed. If the apparatus
responds much faster than τ , then its mere presence is enough to inhibit the
decay. However, since the non-exponential decay time τ is several orders
of magnitude smaller than the lifetime and has never been observed in real
unstable systems, it is difficult to test this version of the watched-pot effect.
3 Transition Postulates
NECESSARY TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
We are left with a theoretical problem. If we cannot use the notion of
“measurement at time t” to explain the meaning of a time-dependent state
vector, what can we say that will justify or codify what physicists do with
such vectors, and that will predict our experience of quantum jumps? A
simple answer is that transitions must be given a fundamental role in the
theory; one of its basic postulates should be of the form “If the system
[however broadly conceived] is in state ψ at time t, there is a probability
Tφψ(t)dt that it will make a transition to state φ between t and t+ dt”. Such
a postulate, if it is to be fundamental, would need to be accompanied by
a clear statement of exactly what the eligible states φ, ψ are. We certainly
need something less ad hoc than the prescription students are left to deduce
from current textbook paradigms, in which it is tacitly assumed that systems
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make transitions between eigenstates of H0, a reference Hamiltonian which
is chosen for no more principled reason than its convenience or familiarity.
A suggestion of this kind was made by John Bell in 1984 [6]. I will
present it in a generalised form [34, 35, 9]. The basic idea is that there is
a set of special physical quantities, which have a fundamental status; Bell
liked to call them beables (as opposed to “observables”) to emphasise their
objective nature (though the proposal is not just that they can be but that
they do be). These quantities always have definite values, which change
stochastically according to transition probabilities which are determined by
the solution to the Schro¨dinger equation. Equivalently, one can replace the
special quantities by a special set of subspaces of state space, namely their
eigenspaces, and the actual values of the special quantities by a vector (the
projection of the full state vector) in the corresponding subspace. I will call
these subspaces the viable subspaces. They may vary with time.
Then the complete description of a physical system at any instant of
time has two parts: a state vector in one of the viable subspaces, which is
what we are aware of and which I will call the visible state; and the solution
of the Schro¨dinger equation, in general a superposition of possible visible
states, which guides the transition of the visible state between the different
subspaces. I will call the latter the pilot state (following Bell [5], who used
this term to describe the role of the wave function in the de Broglie/Bohm
theory, a special case of this theory in which the visible states are eigenstates
of position [35]).
POSSIBLE TRANSITION PROBABILITIES
We know how the pilot state changes in time: it satisfies the Schro¨dinger
equation. What are the rules governing the change of the visible state? We
will now, following Bacciagaluppi and Dickson [2], discuss the possible tran-
sition probabilities which are consistent with the usual quantum-mechanical
rules for the results of measurements.
Let |Ψ(t)〉 be the pilot state, let S1(t),S2(t), . . . be the viable subspaces
at time t, and let Πm(t)〉 be the projection onto Sm. Then the visible state at
time t is one of the states |ψm(t)〉 = Πm|Ψ(t)〉, and there is a set of positive
real numbers Tnm such that for m 6= n, the probability of transition from
|ψm(t)〉 at time t to |ψn(t + δt)〉 at time t + δt is Tnmδt (i.e. Tnmδt is the
probability that the visible state is |ψn(t+ δ(t)〉 at time t+ δt if it is |ψm(t)〉
at time t). Let Pm(t) be the probability that the visible state is |ψ(t)〉 at
time t; this then satisfies the master equation
dPm
dt
=
∑
n
(wmn − wnm) (2)
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where wmn = TmnPn.
We would like to identify Pm(t) with the quantum-mechanical probability
Pm(t) = |〈Ψ(t)|ψm(t)〉|
2 = |〈Ψ(t)|Πm(t)|Ψ(t)〉|
2 (3)
which gives
dPm
dt
= 2Re
[
〈Ψ(t)|Πm(t)|
dΨ
dt
〉+ 〈Ψ(t)|
dΠm
dt
|Ψ(t)〉
]
Since the projectors Πm are complete, this can be written as
dPm
dt
=
∑
n
Jmn
where
Jmn = 2 Im〈Ψ|
(
ℏ
−1ΠmHΠn +
dΠm
dt
Πn
)
|Ψ〉, (4)
H being the Hamiltonian. Then the orthogonality ΠmΠn = δmn gives
Jmn = −Jnm
so it is possible to find wmn such that
wmn − wnm = Jmn and wmn ≥ 0.
One possible solution is
wmn = max(Jmn, 0) (5)
but any positive symmetric xmn could be added to this. More generally, xmn
need not be symmetric but must satisfy
∑
n(xmn − xnm) = 0.
The transition probabilities (5) were originally suggested by Bell [6] and
extended to the time-dependent case by Bacciagaluppi and Dickson [2]. Vink
[39] has investigated more general possibilities and shown that they include
Nelson’s stochastic dynamics [26]. It has been shown [35] that the Bell tran-
sition probabilities (5) yield the deterministic de Broglie-Bohm theory in the
continuum limit of a lattice model of a particle moving in a potential. Bell’s
solution has the feature that between any given pair of states, the transitions
are all one-way; if there can be a transition from |ψm〉 to |ψn〉, there cannot
be a transition from |ψn〉 to |ψm〉. As we will now see, this is a natural feature
of decay processes.
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APPLICATION TO DECAY PROCESSES
Let us return to the problem of the unstable particle and model the decay
A → B + C a little more realistically. If the decay products had just the
one state |BC〉, the hermiticity of the hamiltonian would guarantee that the
initial state |A〉 would be regenerated. For an irreversible decay of the kind
we observe, the decay products must have an infinite-dimensional state space
S ′ in which they can disperse [36]. This makes it possible to suppose that the
time of decay can be measured by examining the decay products. We can
continue to suppose that the unstable particle A has just one state, coupled
by the decay Hamiltonian to a decay state |BC(0)〉 ∈ S ′ which then evolves
by the internal dynamics of the BC system to |BC(t)〉 ∈ S ′ after time t (as
well as being coupled back to |A〉 by the interaction). Thus the Hamiltonian
is H = H0 + εH
′, where:
(i) |ψ0〉 is an eigenstate of H0;
(ii) H0 acts inside S
′ to govern the dispersal of the decay products, so that
e−iH0t|ψ1〉 rapidly becomes orthogonal to |ψ1〉, and remains so:
〈ψ1|e
−iH0t/ℏ|ψ1〉 = 0 unless t < τ ; (6)
(iii) H ′ = |BC(0)〉〈A|+ |A〉〈BC(0)|.
With this Hamiltonian, the solution of the Schro¨dinger equation with
initial condition |ψ(t)〉 = |ψ0〉 at t = 0 is [33]
|ψ(t)〉 = f(t)|ψ0〉+
ε
iℏ
∫ t
0
f(t′)e−iH0(t−t
′)/ℏ|ψ1〉dt
′ (7)
where the survival amplitude f(t) is the solution of the integro-differential
equation
d
dt
[
e−iE0t/ℏf(t)
]
= −
ε2
ℏ2
∫ t
0
χ(t− t′)f(t′)eiE0t
′/ℏdt′ (8)
with χ(t) = 〈ψ1|e
−iH0t/ℏ|ψ1〉.
According to (6) the function χ(t) vanishes for |t| < τ , so an approximate
solution to (8), which neglects the variation of f on time scales of the order
of τ , is
f(t) ≈ e−Γτe−iE0t/ℏ
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with Γ =
ε2
ℏ2
∫ τ
0
χ(t)dt.
Now let us adopt Bell’s interpretation with just two viable subspaces S0
and S1, where S0 is the one-dimensional subspace spanned by |ψ0〉 and S
′ as
above is the subspace containing the states of the decay products. This is to
assume that at any time the system consists either of the unstable particle
A or of a decayed state B + C, and it makes transitions between the two
with probabilities given by (4) and (5). We would expect the transitions to
go only in the direction A→ B + C.
Using the suffix d (= decayed) to refer to S ′, we have transition proba-
bilities T0d and Td0 determined by the real part of the matrix element
1
iℏ
〈ψ(t)|Π0HΠd|ψ(t)〉 = −
ε2
ℏ2
f(t)
∫ t
0
q(t− t′)f(t′)dt′.
At times t≫ τ , this is approximately −Γ|f(t)|2. Hence the transition prob-
abilities have exactly their expected values: T0d = 0 and Td0 = Γ.
There is still a possibly counter-intuitive element in this picture. If a
transition occurs from the unstable state |ψ0〉 at time t, it goes to the state
Πd|ψ(t)〉 = N
−1
∫ t
0
f(t′)e−iH0(t−t
′)/ℏ|ψ1〉dt
′
(where N is a normalisation factor) which is a superposition of states which
have decayed at earlier times t′ < t. If this superposition is examined to
determine the time t′ of decay, there appears to be a possibility that the
result of the measurement will not be the time t at which the transition
occurred according to the stochastic theory, in which case the theory would
not be giving an empirically verifiable account.
To investigate this, let us now consider a model with a more refined
description of the visible states. If the decayed states in S ′ can be examined
to determine the time of decay to |ψ1〉, then e
−iH0t/ℏ|ψ1〉 evolves through
a sequence of eigenstates |ψn〉 of an observable T = “time since decay”.
Suppose that the eigenvalues of T are spaced at equal intervals τ ; then (6)
is generalised to
〈ψn|e
−iH0t/ℏ|ψm〉 = 0 unless |t− (n−m)τ | < τ. (9)
Now the transition probability from |ψ0〉 to |ψm〉 is the imaginary part of
〈ψ(t)|ΠmHΠ0|ψ(t)〉 = εf(t)〈ψ(t)|Πm|ψ1〉
which vanishes unless m = 1. Thus the decay can only be to the correct state
|ψ1〉. This confirms that, if the viable subspaces are chosen as above, Bell’s
transition probabilities give a satisfactory description of the decay process.
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CHOICES, CHOICES . . .
That last sentence would be a triumphant conclusion if it were not for
the fatal weakness of its qualifying clause. Bell’s formulation of quantum
mechanics does not exist until one has specified the viable subspaces. In
this respect it is no improvement on the conventional formulation, which
does not exist until one has specified precisely what physical arrangements
constitute “measurements”. The simplest approach to the problem in the
case of Bell’s formulation is to specify a preferred set of observables – sorry,
beables – whose eigenspaces will be the viable subspaces. However, this is
bound to seem arbitrary; if one is aspiring to give an absolute description of
the physical world, there seems to be no good empirical or theoretical reason
why any particular set of physical quantities should have fundamental status.
Bell’s own proposal in [6] was that these quantities should be the bilinear
invariants of the fundamental fermion fields, but this only emphasises the
arbitrariness: to pick out a particular set of fermion fields as “fundamental”
abolishes the freedom to make field redefinitions, which one would like to
regard as yielding equivalent theories.
A related problem is that of relativistic invariance. A theory based on
transitions between states of the world requires these states to be defined
universally at each instant of time, and therefore has a definition of simul-
taneity built in; in other words, it has a preferred frame of reference. Since
the theory makes the same predictions as conventional relativistic quantum
field theory, this frame of reference would not be experimentally distinguish-
able from any other frame related to it by a Lorentz transformation, but as
Bell conceded in the final sentence of [6], “It seems an eccentric way to make
a world.”
There is a way of avoiding the arbitrariness of a choice of preferred sub-
spaces if the world can be divided into two subsystems, so that the pilot
state space has the structure of a tensor product S1 ⊗ S2. In that case any
vector in the tensor product canonically defines a decomposition of the space
into orthogonal subspaces by means of the Schmidt decomposition: given
|Ψ(t)〉 ∈ S1 ⊗ S2, we have
S1 ⊗ S2 =
∑
λ
S1λ(t)⊗ S2λ(t)⊕ S
′
where S1λ(t) ⊂ S1 is the eigenspace of the marginal density matrix ρ1(t) =
tr2 |Ψ(t)〉〈Ψ(t)| with eigenvalue λ, S2λ(t) ⊂ S2 is the eigenspace of ρ2(t) with
the same eigenvalue, and S ′ is the residual subspace of S1 ⊗ S2, orthogo-
nal to all the S1λ ⊗ S2λ. Taking the viable subspaces at time t to be the
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S1λ(t) ⊗ S2λ(t) and S
′ gives a formulation in which the subsystem S1 is al-
ways in an eigenspace of its density matrix, and the rest of the world is in a
corresponding state.
Such formulations of quantum mechanics, based on the Schmidt decom-
position in a given tensor product structure, are a subclass of “modal inter-
pretations” [37, 15, 2]. They offer the prospect of a theory which describes
real events, reflecting our actual experience of the world, without compro-
mising the unitary symmetry of quantum mechanics. Unfortunately, the
Schmidt decomposition has not proved true to its promise that it would de-
liver a canonically defined set of visible states. It may be granted that the
world consists of subsystems and therefore its state space has a tensor prod-
uct structure (though it might also be queried whether this decomposition
is uniquely given as part of nature), but it is quite clear that there are more
than two subsystems. It is only in a tensor product of two factors, however,
that vectors are guaranteed to have a Schmidt decomposition of the kind
used in modal interpretations; in an n-fold tensor product S1⊗ · · · ⊗ Sn it is
rather unusual [29] for vectors to be of the form
N∑
i
ci|ψ
(1)
i 〉 · · · |ψ
(n)
i 〉
where |ψ
(r)
i 〉(i = 1, . . . , N) are orthonormal vectors in Sr. (There is a gen-
eralisation of the Schmidt decomposition which is valid for any vector in an
n-fold tensor product [11], but it does not relate to the marginal states of
the subsystems as the bipartite Schmidt decomposition does.) In order to
take advantage of the properties of the Schmidt decomposition, therefore,
the theory must specify the way that it divides the world into one particular
subsystem and the rest of the world. We find ourselves once again having to
make arbitrary choices. Desperate attempts to have our cake and eat it are
doomed to failure [38].
. . . AND HOW TO LIVE WITH THEM
If arbitrary choices cannot be avoided, we must consider how to live with
them. But we are used to living with arbitrary choices in physics; they are
characteristic of relativistic theories. There is nothing objectionable about
being forced to make an arbitrary choice as long as we recognise that our
descriptions are made relative to that choice, that any other choice would be
equally valid, and as long as we know how to change from one such choice to
another.
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We have just been considering arbitrary choices of preferred subspaces,
preferred physical quantities or preferred decompositions of the world into
subsystems. They seem objectionable if they are seen to form part of an
objective or absolute description of the world, seen from outside. But there
can be no objection to preferred subspaces, observables or subsystem occur-
ring in a description of the world from inside the world. Then, indeed, one
is obliged to say from where one is observing, what subsystem of the world
is doing the observing, and what observables are being observed.
This brings us to Everitt’s relative-state formulation of quantum me-
chanics, which is closely related to Bell’s beable formulation and to modal
interpretations, though in some respects it is directly opposed to them. I
would now like to present the relative-state formulation in a version which
emphasises these similarities and differences, while also relating it to the
conventional interpretation. I hope this will support a claim that it is the
natural context in which to introduce the quantum jumps whose necessity is
the subject of this paper.
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL
In Bell’s beable interpretation the identities of both the pilot state and
the visible state are, at any given time, facts about the world. They have
the same propositional status. In the modal interpretation an identification
of the pilot state is a modal statement: it tells us what can, or must, or
might be the case. What is the case is the identity of the visible state. In
Everett’s relative-state interpretation the identities of both the pilot state
and the visible state are facts, but they are facts of different kinds. The
difference can be described by the pairs of words “absolute” and “relative”,
or by “objective” and “subjective”. I prefer to use “external” and “internal”.
Most vividly, the distinction has been described by Nagel [24] as that between
“the view from nowhere” and “the view from now here”.
As always, the best system to illustrate the principle is Schro¨dinger’s cat,
with an unstable atom, a diabolical device and a cat Jacko in a locked box
made of unbreakable glass so that the human observer is helplessly aware of
the moment of the cat’s death. If the atom is in its excited state at time
t = 0, the state of our little universe at time t is given by a vector in the
tensor product Satom ⊗ Scat ⊗ Shuman of the form
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−γt|excited〉|alive〉|“Jacko is alive”〉
+
∫ t
0
e−γt
′
|ground〉|dead for time t− t′〉|“Jacko died at t′”〉dt′. (10)
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The statements inside the ket signs for the vectors in Shuman indicate brain
states in which those statements occur as beliefs. They are physical con-
figurations; but they are also statements. Are they true or false? Each is
believed by a brain which has observed the fact it describes, and that fact
belongs to reality. As a human belief, each statement could not be more true.
Yet they cannot both be true, for they contradict each other. I take this to
be characteristic of internal statements in a physical system; the belief of
such a statement is a physical occurrence, and its truth can only be assessed
in the physical context in which it occurs. In the present situation, such a
context consists of a particular component of the universal state (10).
Internal statements are necessarily part of the experience of a conscious
physical being (I use the word “conscious” reluctantly, because I do not want
to be understood as restricting the discussion to human beings, but it seems
to be what I mean). But they are not (or not solely) about experiences – on
the contrary, they are about the physical world, most interestingly the part
of the world which is separate from the experiencing being. What makes
them internal statements is that they are themselves events in the physical
world.
The distinction between internal and external statements offers a pat
way to resolve the tension between the two kinds of time development in the
conventional textbook formulation of quantum mechanics: the continuous,
deterministic evolution of the state vector given by the Schro¨dinger equation,
and the discontinuous, probabilistic change following a measurement, given
by the projection postulate. The idea, roughly speaking, would be that the
Schro¨dinger equation is an external statement, while the projection postulate
is an internal one. More precisely, let |Ψ(t)〉 be a time-labelled sequence
of states satisfying the Schro¨dinger equation. Then it is an external (and
tenseless) statement that the world passes through the sequence of states
|Ψ(t)〉. Suppose these states are products |φ(t)〉|ψ(t)〉 where |φ(t)〉 is a state
of a measuring apparatus and a conscious observer, while |ψ(t)〉 is the state of
the rest of the world (or simply the system being measured by the apparatus),
and suppose the Hamiltonian includes a measurement (an instantaneous one,
since I am — for the moment — in that convention) made at time t0. Then it
is an internal statement (and a tensed one, with a “now” of t0+ ǫ) that after
the measurement the state φ(t)〉 has jumped to an eigenstate of the measured
quantity. A report of a measurement result is an internal statement, made
by a conscious system; a general statement about measurement results must
be made relative to a particular conscious system (just as statements about
energy in special relativity are necessarily relative to a particular frame of
reference).
If the argument of this paper is accepted, statements about results of
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measurements should be replaced by statements about spontaneous transi-
tions, or quantum jumps. But these should still be statements of the same
type: a report of a quantum jump is therefore an internal statement, made
by a conscious system, and general statements about quantum jumps should
be made relative to a particular conscious system.
There is now no problem of arbitrariness in specifying the viable subspaces
between which quantum jumps occur. The second law of quantum dynamics,
governing the transitions of the visible state, is now to be understood as
describing the experiences of conscious systems — it is a collection of different
laws, one for each conscious system; and there is no loss of unitary symmetry
in the fact that a preferred system of subspaces occurs in each of these laws.
There are no preferences in the general statement from which the individual
statements of experienced transitions are derived.
There is, however, a preference to be declared for one of two preference-
free formulations of the general law governing experienced transitions. In
describing the experience of a particular conscious system, the viable sub-
spaces could be determined by means of a particularly relevant set of observ-
ables; or they could be the subspaces arising in the Schmidt decomposition
relative to a particularly relevant tensor-product split, namely the split into
the conscious system and the rest of the world. At first sight the latter pos-
sibility looks more attractive, perhaps because of a lingering prejudice that
Schmidt decompositions are more canonical than choices of bases. But if we
are avowedly describing the experiences of a stated conscious system, this
already canonically picks out the basis of states of that system in which it
has definite experiences — what Lockwood [21] calls the consciousness basis,
though I will use the term experience basis.3 Moreover, if we were to use
the Schmidt decomposition there would be no guarantee that the transitions
which the conscious system experiences would actually take it to states of
definite experience. It is probably true to a high degree of approximation that
the states of the conscious system occurring in the Schmidt decomposition,
the eigenstates of its density matrix, will in fact be eigenstates of experi-
ence; but this will remain an approximation, and if our aim is to describe
experience we should make sure that we actually do so.
We thus arrive at the following general formulation of the laws of motion
in quantum mechanics:
1. The universe is described by a time-dependent state vector |Ψ(t)〉 in
the universal state space S, which evolves according to the Schro¨dinger
3In passing, let us note that an answer to the question “Why don’t we see superpositions
of macroscopic states?” is that there is no experience state describing such seeing. A
superposition of two experience states is not an experience state.
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equation.
2. The experience of any conscious subsystem C of the universe is de-
scribed at any time t by a state vector |φn〉 in the experience basis of
that subsystem’s state space SC . If this experience is described by |φn〉
at time t, then the probability that it is described by |φm〉 at time t+δt
is Tmnδt where
Tmn =
max(Jmn, 0)
〈ψn(t)|ψn(t)〉
, (11)
Jmn = 2 Im
[
ℏ
−1 (〈φm|〈ψm(t)|)H (|φn〉|ψn(t)〉)
]
(12)
and the states |ψn(t)〉 are the states of the rest of the world, (elements
of SR where S = SC ⊗SR), which are the coefficients of the experience
basis states in the expansion of the universal state vector with respect
to this basis:
|Ψ(t)〉 =
∑
n
|φn〉|ψn(t)〉.
IS YOUR POSTULATE REALLY NECESSARY?
In the actual practice of physicists giving theoretical analyses of exper-
iments in quantum optics, like the quantum-jump and watched-pot exper-
iments described above, it is quite common to base the analysis on an as-
sumption of quantum jumps — see, for example, [10, 13, 16, 30, 4, 41].
This is sometimes regarded as a practically convenient method of solving the
equations of motion for a density matrix, sometimes as a description of a fun-
damental physical process. If the latter, there is a need for a basic principle to
decide exactly what jumps to what; at present [41] this decision is an ad hoc
one, and different theorists make different assumptions. Attempts to derive
a quantum-jump approach from first principles [16, 30], using conventional
notions of measurement in quantum mechanics, fall foul of the watched-pot
effect; it becomes necessary to restrict the application of the measurement
postulates in a way which is once again ad hoc. The postulates presented
in the previous section are intended to provide a firm basis from which, in
principle, definite statements about the occurrence of quantum jumps could
be derived.
However, there is another possible attitude. The quantum-jump pos-
tulate proposed above is a replacement for the conventional measurement
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postulate; both function as interpretations of the time-dependent state vec-
tor obtained by solving the Schro¨dinger equation. This is regarded as a set
of different state vectors, one for each time, and each of these is interpreted;
thus there is a set of interpretations (one for each time in the postulate pro-
posed here; one for each measurement in the conventional formulation). But
one could instead regard the time-dependent state vector as a single object,
a vector-valued function of a real variable t, and attempt to give it a single
interpretation. Time-dependent phenomena like quantum jumps should then
emerge by examining this single interpretation of a time-dependent object.
An experiment extended over time should be regarded as a single experiment,
in which time-dependent phenomena are registered as a record which can be
examined at a later time; a conscious experience extended over time can be
treated as a single experience at a later time which contains memories of
experiences at different times.
Let us see how such an approach could be applied to Dehmelt’s quantum-
jump experiment. In the appendix the Schro¨dinger equation is solved for this
system, and it is shown that to a good approximation the solution can be
written as
|Ψ(t)〉 = |ψ0〉
{
f˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|φ˜n(t)〉
}
+ |ψ1〉
{
g˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|θ˜n(t)〉
}
+ |ψ2〉
{
h˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|χ˜n(t)〉
}
, (13)
where |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 are the three atomic states shown in Fig.2, and |φ˜n〉, |θ˜n〉
and |χ˜n〉 are states of the electromagnetic field, each containing n photons,
defined recursively by
|φ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
f˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
dt′,
|θ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
g˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
e−iΩRt
′
dt′,
|χ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
h˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
e−iΩBt
′
dt′.
(14)
where Hf is the Hamiltonian governing the evolution of the electromagnetic
field, and a†R and a
†
B are creation operators for the red and blue photons
associated with the excited levels of the atom — “emitted when the atom
jumps from an excited level to the ground state”, we would say if we had
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any warrant for talking about quantum jumps. But now, it could be ar-
gued, (13) itself gives us such a warrant. It shows the state at time t as a
superposition of states of the atom and the electromagnetic field which can
be distinguished by a suitable measurement at time t. Such a measurement
could not only determine only how many red and blue photons are present
— thus identifying a field state |χ˜n(t)〉, say — but also, by measuring how
far the photons have moved from the atom, measure the value of t′ in, for
example, e−iHf(t−t
′)a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉, i.e. the time at which the last red photon
was emitted. Likewise the times of earlier emissions could be determined.
In this way the history of the quantum jumps which occurred before time t
could be determined by a measurement at time t.
Thus the state Ψ(t) is a superposition of states each of which contains
a record of a particular sequence of quantum jumps. The full state Ψ(t)
evolves continuously, but each component describes discontinuous events,
ultimately because of the quantisation of the electromagnetic field. Explicit
postulation of quantum jumps at a fundamental level can be replaced by a
single application of the usual measurement postulate at a late time t.
There is probably no conclusive argument against this position, and I
suspect that many physicists will find it congenial. Nevertheless, it strikes
me as unsatisfactory. It requires an arbitrary choice of the time t at which the
all-deciding measurement is to be made; this can be put off to a vague “at the
end of the day”, but it remains an instant in time, and nothing can be said
about the thereafter. Such an interpretation is an attempt to step outside
time and take an eternal view, as is certainly possible in classical physics; but
it appears not to be allowed by quantum mechanics. If the interpretation of
quantum mechanics is going to be bound by time eventually, it seems to me
to be best not to put it off and to acknowledge the inescapable importance
of time in our experience and our understanding.
Appendix: Quantum Theory of Quantum Jumps
In this appendix we give a conventional quantum-mechanical theory of the
quantum-jump experiment [25, 31, 8], solving the full Schro¨dinger equation
for the system consisting of the three-level atom and the electromagnetic
field. This does not appear to have been done in previous theoretical treat-
ments of the experiment. Most authors [1, 19, 20, 27, 28, 32] provide this
by considering the atomic density matrix, including off-diagonal elements,
and using optical Bloch equations. This, however, requires an assumption
that quantum jumps occur in the crucial spontaneous emission part of the
experiment. The same is true of the treatment [12] in terms of the state
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vector of the atom. A complete treatment of the atom-field system has been
given by Zoller, Marte and Walls [43] who obtain an equation for the atomic
density matrix in which an effective Hamiltonian, incorporating the effects
of quantum jumps in the same way as in the other papers, is justified by an
appeal to Mollow’s fully quantum-mechanical treatment of resonance fluores-
cence in two-level atoms [23], but no such treatment has been given for the
three-level atom involved in Dehmelt’s experiment. Barchielli [3] has given
a theory of the experiment in terms of a quantum stochastic equation. He
obtains this as an approximation to the deterministic Schro¨dinger equation
of the atom-field system, using the same approximations as in the calculation
given here. He does not comment on the origin or physical significance of
the stochastic elements in his treatment.
The theory given here may appear to be less than fully quantum-mech-
anical in that the laser beams are described by classical oscillating fields, but
this has been shown by Moller [23] to be an accurate description of a coher-
ent quantum field in interaction with an atom with appropriate boundary
conditions at t = −∞. In order to obtain a solution we need to use the
rapid-dispersal approximation, which can be justified from quantum elec-
trodynamics [36], and to neglect rapidly oscillating quantities, which is a
self-consistency requirement, justified retrospectively.
The atom is illuminated by two light beams, the red beam tuned near the
frequency ΩR = (E1−E0)/ℏ of the strong transition, and the blue beam tuned
near the frequency ΩB = (E2−E0)/ℏ of the weak transition to the shelf state.
We take these both to be coherent (laser) beams. Let ∆R and ∆B be their
detunings, so that they are described by classsical fields ER cos[(ΩR +∆R)t]
and EB cos[(ΩB + ∆B)t]. The corresponding contributions to the atomic
Hamiltonian are
HR = er ·ER cos[(ΩR +∆R)t] and HB = er · EB cos[(ΩB +∆B)t]
but the effect of neglecting rapidly oscillating terms can be obtained by re-
placing these by
HR = λe
−i(ΩR+∆R)t|ψ1〉〈ψ0|+ λ
∗ei(ΩR+∆R)t|ψ0〉〈ψ1| (15)
and HB = Λe
−i(ΩB+∆B)t|ψ2〉〈ψ0|+ Λ
∗ei(ΩB+∆B)t|ψ0〉〈ψ2| (16)
where |ψ0〉, |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉 are the three atomic states and
λ = e〈ψ1|r · ER|ψ0〉, Λ = e〈ψ2|r · EB|ψ0〉.
The interaction between the atom and the electromagnetic field, which is
responsible for spontaneous emission from the excited states |ψ1〉 and |ψ2〉,
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is described by a Hamiltonian of the form [36]
Hint = α
(
|ψ1〉〈ψ0|aR + |ψ0〉〈ψ1|a
†
R
)
+ β
(
|ψ2〉〈ψ0|aB + |ψ0〉〈ψ2|a
†
B
)
(17)
where a†R, a
†
B, aR and aB are single-photon creation and annihilation operators
which create and annihilate photons associated with the 1 → 0 and 2 → 0
transitions (we will call these “red” and “blue” photons, although the photon
states created by a†R and a
†
B do not have definite frequencies [36]).
The full Hamiltonian for the atom-field system is
H = Ha +Hf +HR +HB +Hint (18)
where Ha is the Hamiltonian for the atom alone, which has eigenstates
|ψ0〉, |ψ1〉, |ψ2〉 with eigenvalues E0, E1, E2; and Hf is the Hamiltonian for
the field alone. The state of the whole system at time t can be written
|Ψ(t)〉 = e−iE0t/ℏ|ψ0〉
{
f(t)|0〉+
∞∑
n=1
|φn(t)〉
}
+ e−iE1t/ℏ|ψ1〉
{
g(t)|0〉+
∞∑
n=1
|θn(t)〉
}
e−i∆Rt
+ e−iE2t/ℏ|ψ2〉
{
h(t)|0〉+
∞∑
n=1
|χn(t)〉
}
e−i∆Bt
(19)
where |0〉 is the vacuum field state and |φn(t)〉, |θn(t)〉, |χn(t)〉 are n-photon
states. The Schro¨dinger equation for |Ψ(t)〉, with the Hamiltonian (5), gives
i
df
dt
= λ∗g + Λ∗h,
i
dg
dt
= λf +∆Rg + αe
iΩRt〈0|aR|φ1(t)〉,
i
dh
dt
= Λf +∆Bh+ βe
iΩBt〈0|aB|φ1(t)〉;
(20)
i
d
dt
|φn〉 =Hf|φn〉+ λ
∗|θn〉+ Λ
∗|χn〉
+ αe−iΩRta†R|θn−1〉+ βe
−iΩBta†B|χn−1〉,
i
d
dt
|θn〉 =(Hf +∆R) |θn〉+ λ|φn〉+ αe
iΩRtaR|φn+1〉,
i
d
dt
|χn〉 =(Hf +∆B) |χn〉+ Λ|φn〉+ βe
i∆BtaB|φn+1〉,
(21)
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with the understanding that |θ0(t)〉 = g(t)|0〉 and |χ0(t)〉 = h(t)|0〉.
We can now use the fact that the spontaneously emitted photons quickly
move away from the vicinity of the atom to eliminate the terms in |φ1〉 from
eqs. (20) and the terms containing |φn+1〉 from (21). Let x =

 xy
z

 be an
eigenvector of the matrix A =

 0 λ∗ Λ∗λ ∆R 0
Λ 0 ∆B

 with eigenvalue ξ; then eqs.
(21) can be solved for the combination
|Ξn(t)〉 = x
∗|φn(t)〉+ y
∗|θn(t)〉+ z
∗|χn(t)〉 (22)
as an integral over the interval 0 < t′ < t of an integrand containing
a†R|θn−1(t
′)〉, a†B|χn+1(t
′)〉, aR|φn+1(t
′)〉 and aB|φn+1(t
′)〉. The last two can
be removed by applying an annihilation operator aB or aR and using the
rapid-dispersal approximations [36]∫ t
0
aXe
−iHf(t−t
′)/ℏaY |φn+1(t
′)〉 = 0, (23)
aXe
−iHf(t−t
′)/ℏa†Y |Υ(t
′)〉 = 0 if t− t′ ≫ τ, (24)
∫ t
0
aXe
−iHf(t−t
′)/ℏa†Y |Υ(t
′)〉e−iΩY t
′
F (t′)dt′ = QXY |Υ(t)〉F (t)e
−iΩY t (25)
where X and Y stand for R or B, QXY is a constant, τ is the dispersal time
which is of the order of 10−18s, |Υ(t)〉 is any of the n-photon states of interest,
and F (t) is any slowly varying function. This yields
aR|Ξn(y)〉 = −iαx
∗
(
QRR|θn−1(t)〉e
−iΩRt +QRB|χn−1(t)〉e
−iΩBt
)
(26)
and a similar equation with aB. Note that the right-hand side does not
contain the eigenvalue ξ. We can repeat this for each of the eigenvectors
x1,x2,x3 of the matrix A; then, using the fact that these eigenvectors satisfy
x1x
†
1 + x2x
†
2 + x3x
†
3 = 1,
we obtain
aR|φn+1(t)〉 = −iα
(
QRR|χn(t)〉e
−iΩRt +QRB|χn(t)〉e
−iΩBt
)
. (27)
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In particular, for n = 0 we obtain expressions for 〈0|aR|φ1〉 and 〈0|aB|φ1〉
in terms of g(t) and h(t). Putting these into eq. (20) and ignoring rapidly
oscillating terms with the frequency ΩB − ΩR gives a set of homogeneous
equations for the amplitudes f, g, h which are the same as those obtained by
intuitive arguments assuming quantum jumps:
df
dt
= −iλ∗g − iΛ∗h,
dg
dt
= −iλf − (γR + i∆R)g,
dh
dt
= −iΛf − (γB + i∆B)h
(28)
where
γR =
α2QRR
ℏ2
and γB =
α2QBB
ℏ2
are the (complex) decay rates (including energy shifts) for the spontaneous
transitions 1→ 0 and 2→ 0.
In general, using (27) to eliminate |φn+1〉 from the equations (21) for the
n-photon states |φn〉, |θn〉, |χn〉 yields inhomogeneous equations which have
the same matrix as (28) in their homogeneous part, with a source term for
|φn〉 involving the (n− 1)-photon states |θn−1〉 and |χn−1〉:
i
d
dt
|φn〉 =Hf|φn〉+ λ
∗|θn〉+ Λ
∗|χn〉
+ αe−iΩRta†R|θn−1〉+ αe
−iΩBta†B|χn−1〉,
i
d
dt
|θn〉 =λ|φn〉+ (Hf +∆R − iγR)|θn〉
i
d
dt
|χn〉 =Λ|φn〉+ (Hf +∆tB − iγtB)|χn〉
(29)
(after dropping rapidly oscillating terms).
Suppose the atom is in its ground state at t = 0, no photons having
been emitted; then the initial conditions are f(0) = 1, g(0) = h(0) = 0
and |φn(0)〉 = |θn(0)〉 = |χn〉 = 0. The solution (f(t), g(t), h(t)) of the
homogeneous equations (28) with these initial conditions can then be used
as a Green’s function for the inhomogeneous equations (29) (after taking
account of the field Hamiltonian Hf by multiplying by e
−iHft). The result is
|φn(t)〉 =− iα
∫ t
0
e−iHf(t−t
′)f(t− t′){
a†R|θn−1(t
′)〉e−iΩRt
′
+ a†B|χn−1(t
′)e−iΩBt
′
}
dt′
(30)
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with similar expressions for |θn(t)〉 and |χn(t)〉. It is more meaningful to
present these in terms of the actual n-photon states, without the exponential
factors that were introduced into the definition (19) in order to simplify the
calculations. Thus, if we define quantities with a tilde so that the full state
at time t is
|Ψ(t)〉 = |ψ0〉
{
f˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|φ˜n(t)〉
}
+ |ψ1〉
{
g˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|θ˜n(t)〉
}
+|ψ2〉
{
h˜(t)|0〉+
∑
n
|χ˜n(t)〉
}
,
(31)
then the n-photon states |φ˜n〉, |θ˜n〉 and |χ˜n〉 are given by
|φ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
f˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
dt′,
|θ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
g˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
e−iΩRt
′
dt′,
|χ˜n(t)〉 = −iα
∫ ∞
0
h˜(t− t′)e−iHf(t−t
′)
{
a†R|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉+ a†B|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉
}
e−iΩBt
′
dt′.
(32)
As in the case of resonance fluorescence in two-state atoms [36], these
expressions have a simple intuitive analysis as superpositions of states in
which the atom was in an excited state at some time t′, having previously
emitted n − 1 photons, emitted the nth photon at time t′, and emitted no
further photons between times t′ and t. (This description, however, does not
account for the exponential factors e−iΩRt
′
and e−iΩBt
′
in |θ˜n(t)〉 and |χ˜n(t)〉.)
The rapid-dispersal property of the photons created by a†B and a
†
R ensures
that the different states in the superpositions do not interfere with each other,
so that the probabilities for the existence of n photons follow classical laws;
for example, the probability that there are n photons at time t and the atom
is in its red state is
〈θ˜n(t)|θ˜n(t)〉 = 2Re γR
∫ t
0
|g˜(t− t′)|2〈θ˜n−1(t
′)|θ˜n−1(t
′)〉dt′
+ 2Re γB
∫ t
0
|g˜(t− t′)|2〈χ˜n−1(t
′)|χ˜n−1(t
′)〉dt′
(33)
which is the probability that would be obtained by a naive argument as-
suming that the atom is always in one of its three states, that when it is in
one of the two higher states it has a probability (2Re γ)dt of decaying into
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the ground state in time dt, and that if it is in the ground state at time t′
the probability that it will be in the first excited state at a later time t is
|g˜(t− t′)|2.
Eqs. (32) contain the full paradox of the description of time develop-
ment in quantum mechanics. They represent the development of the system
as being continuous in time, and yet they describe an experience (that of
watching the trapped atom) which is undeniably discontinuous. This em-
phasises the shadowy status of the state vector, whose probabilistic and on-
tological aspects coexist uneasily. Insofar as the state vector has the nature
of a probability, it is not surprising that it should change continuously while
describing a discontinuous process; this is normal for a discrete stochastic
process. In such a process, however, the states are described quite separately
from the probabilities. The formulation of quantum mechanics suggested in
the body of the paper can be seen as restoring this separation in the distinc-
tion between the pilot state and the visible state, the former being part of
the statement of probabilities while the latter is (in classical terms) a state
specification.
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